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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the formation of Ukrainian national identity.  The formation 
of this national identity will determine the pace and direction of Ukrainian modernization 
and unfolds in concert with the unification of Europe; the further progress of NATO 
enlargement and the revival of Russian nationalism at the end of the first decade of this 
century.  The Ukrainian process is logically suggested by the country’s neighbor:  
Poland.  In the Polish model since 1989, national identity and a leading role in a uniting 
Europe sped the pace of reform. 
Modern-day Ukraine has all the attributes of a state except a consolidated national 
identity.  The primary internal reasons for the lack of national identity are the 
interpretations of the history of the Ukrainian people, ethnic composition, and regional 
loyalties.  Furthermore, the interference of Russia on ethnic, linguistic, regional, and 
economic levels exacerbates the present divisions in Ukrainian society.  
As this thesis reveals, the process of nation-building is intertwined with state-
building.  The United States and European Union member states have an important stake 
in the outcome of this process because it will not only significantly shape Ukraine’s 
foreign policy orientation, but also influence the balance of power on Europe’s eastern 
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The present work treats the character of Ukrainian nationalism in the recent past 
and its implications for the making of US and NATO security and defense policy. 
Generally, scholars view the development of a nation-state as a pragmatic or at least 
rational process.1  By the same token, the irrational aspects of nationalism and national 
identity, as a facet of nation-state development, have been an area of theoretical conflict, 
when not a matter of abject lack of interest, on the part of scholars in North America and  
western Europe.2  Indeed, before 1989, “nationalism” and “national identity” were vulgar 
words in the minds of many observers, who associated such notions with fascism. 
Similarly, “nationalism” struck scholars from the 1970s and 1980s as a relic of the past, 
of little contemporary interest save to those who believed that fascism endured in the 
military industrial complex of NATO (a subject too broad for this inquiry).   
This summary dismissal of nationalism’s relevance itself became passé after 
1989, when two tracks of European identity (and therefore policy) arose and occasionally 
collided:  the advance of supra-national ideals in western Europe and the revival of 
nationalism in central and eastern Europe in the formation of nation-states, especially 
post-communist state-building and foreign-policy development.  That is to say, nearly all 
the issues facing Ukraine in foreign policy, economics, and democracy are rooted in the 
questions of national identity conceived in classical terms that easily can be interpreted 
through the experience of the 21st century.  In other words, there is a strong element of 
continuity in the romantic, irrational and potential explosive political power of the 
national idea in conflict with the supra-national strivings of the European past and 
present.3      
                                                 
1 Martin Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 35. 
2 Isaiah Berlin, Historical Inevitability (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1955), 37.  
3 For greater discussion of the national idea, see:  Ivan T. Berend, Linda Colley, and Hagen Schulze. 
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Thus, the overall goal of this thesis is to explore the process of Ukrainian 
national-identity formation.  The formation of this national identity will determine the 
pace and direction of Ukrainian modernization and unfolds in concert with the unification 
of Europe, the further progress of NATO enlargement and the revival of Russian 
nationalism at the end of the first decade of this century.  Contrary to the Polish 
experience, which was able to develop a national identity from within, the situation in 
Ukraine is different for both internal and external reasons.   Internally, the differences are 
not only language, a more heterogeneous society than Poland, but more importantly are 
derived from a lack of historic nation-state experience and a lack of collective memory.  
Externally, the interference of Russia on ethnic, linguistic, regional, and economic levels 
exacerbates the present divisions in Ukrainian society.   
Additionally, the question of EU membership had been one of the few nationally 
unifying issues in modern Ukrainian history.  Most non-Communist political parties 
support EU membership because of the benefits it would bring in terms of 
democratization and improved standard of living.4  Thus, EU membership is not as 
divisive an issue as potential NATO membership.  Indeed, among the populace, NATO 
membership is perceived differently than EU membership.  Decades of Soviet 
propaganda against NATO, coupled with NATO’s intervention in Kosovo as well as the 
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, continue to cause regional divisions over attitudes towards 
NATO membership. 
The Ukrainian process is logically suggested by one of the country’s neighbors:  
Poland.  In the Polish model since 1989, national identity and a comprehension of its 
place in a uniting Europe determined the pace of reform.  This reform helped gain 
Poland’s entry into NATO and the European Union.  It begins with a notable national 
unity—or unifying nationalism.  Granted the community of fate that binds especially 
western Ukraine to Poland—not least as a result of a common Habsburg legacy of multi-
nationalism and the heritage of the nationalities of these two formidable former 
empires—then the record of the Polish experience offers insight into the tumultuous 
                                                 
4 Taras Kuzio, “Is Ukraine Part of Europe’s Future?” Washington Quarterly 29 (2006):  90. 
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political development of Ukraine in the last five years, even granted that the 
circumstances facing Ukraine are more conflicted and burdensome than those that faced 
the Poles from 1989 until 2004.5  Among other things, the Ukrainians have not yet 
fashioned a unitary (or unifying) national program on which to build its international 
profile.   
B. GENERAL HYPOTHESIS 
The currently forming, post-communist national identity of Ukraine is rooted in 
the country’s unhappy history in the twentieth century.6  In the former USSR (of which 
Ukraine was a component republic), research into questions of national identity was 
forbidden as part of communist doctrine.7  Moreover, issues of national identity were 
taboo subjects in Soviet social sciences, suffused as they were in the obligatory 
“internationalism” of the “fraternity of socialist nations.”  To this day, Ukraine remains 
dominated by the reductionist spirit of Marxism;8 as such the full range of national-
identity research is not taking place in the manner necessary for the country to come to 
grips with the past—let alone to fashion a non-weaponized, scholarly basis for policy that 
avoids the demagoguery that has reasserted itself in Europe and Russia with troubling 
implications for the health of democracy, particularly in the former Soviet bloc.  As a 
result, Ukraine has still not developed a workable national identity since independence in 
1991.9  
Three related questions arise from Ukraine’s pursuit of an enduring national 
identity.  First, what are the mechanisms for the formation of national identity?  Poland 
                                                 
5 See George Sanford, Ilya Prizel, and Aleksander Gieysztor, et al. 
6 See Anatol Lieven, Bohdan Harasymiw, Ivan L. Rudnytsky, Alxander J. Motyl, Peter J. Potichnyj, et 
al. 
7 Volodymyr Zviglyanich, “Ukrainian Identity and Challenges of Modernity,” The Jamestown 
Foundation 5 (1999).  23. 
8 Theoretically, Marxism was an example of reductionism.  Marxism reduced the assortment of history, 
politics, ethnicity, culture into a few categorical pairs:  bourgeoisie-proletariat, private-public ownership, 
etc.  Marxism-Leninism provided ideological guidance to Ukraine’s political elites for over 70 years.  
Numerous attempts were made to destroy Ukrainian national identification other than part of the Soviet 
working class.   
9 See Mark von Hagen, Anatol Lieven, Bohdan Harasymiw, Ivan L. Rudnytsky, Alxander J. Motyl, 
Peter J. Potichnyj, et al. 
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and Ukraine share common Slavic roots, extensive cultural cross-pollination, similar 
geographic locations, and similar religious challenges, yet they have had obviously 
different successes at developing a national identity because of the specific circumstances 
of their awakening as modern nations as well as their process of extraction from the 
northern courts from the mid-nineteenth century until the recent past.  Second, why, with 
similar challenges to overcome, has Poland been more successful than Ukraine at 
developing a modern national identity?  Finally, and most important, especially in light of 
the recent parliamentary elections on September 30, 2007 in Ukraine, what is the likely 
direction of Ukraine’s development based on national identity and what are the 
implications for the making of U.S. security policy granted the turmoil in the European 
scene in the final years of the present decade? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE 
 It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic 
movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate 
goal of ending tyranny in our world.  In the world today, the fundamental 
character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among 
them.  The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, 
well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct 
themselves responsibly in the international system.10 
The basis for the National Security Strategy, as articulated here, was suggested by 
the Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington:  “Democratic states have 
commonalities with other democratic states and hence do not fight each other.”11  While 
the current global counterinsurgency being waged by the United States is focused on the 
Middle East, the former Soviet Republics also represent a challenging proving ground for 
democracy, particularly in view of the nature of nationalism in central and eastern Europe 
as visible in the former Yugoslavia and the latent power of integral nationalism in such 
places as the Balkans, Hungary, Poland and further east.  In other words, post-communist 
                                                 
10 National Security Strategy of the United States.  March 2006.  
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/), accessed 15 August 2007. 
11 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York:  
Simon and Schuster, 1996), 34. 
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Ukraine either will get nationalism right or will come off the democratic rails altogether, 
with enduring ramifications for European and U.S. security and foreign policy. 
In the event, the appearance of an independent Ukraine in 1991 was unexpected 
by political analysts and scholars who had adhered to notions of the 1970s and 1980s that 
nationalism was a spent force from the early twentieth century.  This phenomenon 
derived mostly from the lack of a well-defined Ukrainian identity, which made the land 
area now known as Ukraine an unlikely candidate for statehood and revival as a nation.  
Additionally, Ukraine's statehood also came as a surprise to many observers because of 
the woeful lack of knowledge of Ukraine and its history, both internally and externally;12 
students of the old “second world” had grown accustomed to thinking of Ukraine as a 
component of the Soviet Union and, thus, expected Ukraine to remain dependent, if not 
fully integrated within the new Russia. Ukraine’s unexpected independence in 1991 
magnified the problems associated with a state possessing a weak national identity, 
further weakened by the nation’s non-existent presence in international institutions and 
among power elites.  Moreover, with Ukraine’s political, economic, and security issues, 
an extended phase of friction with its neighbors has unfolded that can be addressed best 
by integration in Euro-Atlantic security institutions while simultaneously somehow 
mollifying Russian irredentism.   
For Moscow, Ukraine is the single most valuable territory of the former Soviet 
empire for reasons that defy any reasonable calculus of policy. Russian ethnicity can 
trace its roots to Ukraine (or at least the medieval Kievan Rus, which fostered the eastern 
side of European development after Rome and Byzantium decline a millennium or so 
ago), and Ukraine today remains home to more than 10 million ethnic Russians.  
Additionally, Ukraine possessed some of the Soviet Union’s few warm water ports, the 
bulk of Russia’s infrastructure connection to the West, and most importantly, 1000 miles 
of buffer from NATO.  With Ukraine in Russia’s sphere of influence, a Russian 
resurgence is possible—and events of 2006 and 2007 since Putin’s speech to the 
Wehrkund meeting in Munich of early 2007 suggest such a possibility.  Conversely, 
                                                 
12 Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University 
Press, 2000), 45. 
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without Ukraine, Russia as a global power is unfeasible, and its role as a regional power 
is no longer guaranteed.13  For all these reasons, Russia has much of its future invested in 
a particular outcome of the Ukrainian national development. 
Ukraine is the second largest country in Europe (second only to Russia); as a 
potentially prominent power in its own right, Ukraine will have to decide whether to 
continue to pursue a tumultuous relationship linked somehow with Russia or attempt to 
“return to Europe” as Poland has done.  However, this return to Europe cannot be 
accomplished until a single national identity is embraced by the several competing sub-
groups within the present nation-state. 
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH 
This research will explore reasons that Ukraine has failed to develop a consistent 
national identity 16 years after independence, while Poland, albeit not a former Soviet 
territory, but with similar background as a rigorously cultivated part of the Soviet 
Union’s dependent buffer to the west, was able to develop a strong concept of national 
identity that led ultimately to a “return to Europe.”  Poland is now a member of NATO 
and the European Union, while Ukraine vacillates between Soviet-era diplomatic habits 
and isolation. 
This thesis focuses on Ukraine and Poland because, despite their common Slavic 
roots and cultural cross-influence, they represent vastly different political entities.  At the 
same time, they share a turbulent history marked by a lack of institutions to anchor their 
national identities, making them each reliant on their collective memory.  At various 
points throughout their respective (and collective) histories, Ukraine and Poland both 
were absorbed into larger political empires.  This lack of freedom meant that ideas of 
identity were never fully developed, even in the so-called golden age of nationalism in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  The contemporary states of Poland and 
Ukraine had little to no collective memory to draw on once the Iron Curtain fell—
allowing both countries to modernize, assuming they could establish their national 
                                                 
13 “Geopolitical Diary:  The Grab for Ukraine,”  Strategic Forecasting, Inc.  April 4, 2007.  
(https://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=286764&id=286764&camp), accessed 
4 April 2007.  
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identities as a prerequisite.  Comparative analysis of Poland and Ukraine will help isolate 
the development of a national identity and illuminate factors that contribute to a 
successful national identity.   
Ukraine and Poland are ideal case studies of intra- and interstate comparisons and 
their relationship to national identity.  Medieval Poland was a multinational empire that, 
in the early modern era, disappeared as anything but a regional designation for 123 years.  
Yet even from this experience of national non-existence, partition, invasion and 
dependence, Poland has emerged since the collapse of communism as a state with a 
strong, consolidated national identity.  (Some of Poland’s incipient national unity owes a 
perverse debt to the successive redrawings of its borders and its various masters’ racial 
policies, which left a particularly homogenous people in the Poland of its 1949—and 
1990—boundaries.)  On the other hand, while Ukraine also went from preeminence in a 
multinational empire to subject nation within later, stronger regimes--excepting a few 
short years of its history—a consolidated national identity remains elusive for Ukraine.  
Post-1990 Ukraine enjoys no such ready-made coherence, even at the geographical level.  
Agricultural Western Ukraine is composed of Greek-Catholic Ukrainian-speaking ethnic 
Ukrainians.  The Eastern half of Ukraine is industrial, composed mainly of Eastern 
Orthodox, Russian-speaking ethnic Russians.  These social, economic, and geographic 
divisions derive from Western Ukraine’s longer association with Polish and Austro-
Hungarian rule and Eastern Ukraine’s much longer association with Russian/Soviet 
rule.14 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The following comparative examination shows how history, culture, and ethnicity 
affect perceptions of national identity—and thus condition foreign policies—in Ukraine 
and Poland.  Chapter II provides a literature review that focuses on critical research on 
post-Soviet national identity in general, and on Ukraine and Poland specifically.  Chapter 
II also outlines the context in which to compare the two states.  Chapters III and IV are 
                                                 
14 Stephen Shulman, “The Cultural Foundations of Ukrainian National Identity,” Ethnic & Racial 
Studies, 22 (1999):  1011-36. 
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the main chapters of this thesis and delve deeper into the national identity issue in Poland 
and Ukraine, respectively.  Each of these two chapters focuses on the foundations of 
national identity—notably history, geography, linguistics, religion, culture, ethnicity, and 
economy.  The goal is to determine the role and significance of these different factors on 
the development of national identity in each country and ascertain the reasons for 
successes or failures in each case.  Finally, Chapter V summarizes the major findings of 
the research with respect to the major research question: national identity development 
and the factors that contribute most to success for failure of that development.  It also 
addresses policy implications for the United States in terms of achieving and maintaining 
positive relations with Ukraine.   
 9 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. STATES, NATIONS, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
National identity is a complex concept that comprises many different 
components—ethnic, cultural, territorial, historical, and economic—that often represent 
bonds that bind a people together. As such, the multi-dimensional notion of national 
identity clearly sets it apart from the idea of the state.  Here we see the first of many 
inconsistencies in the literature focused on nations, states, and national identity.  In 
conventional culture, it is commonplace for nation and state to be used interchangeably, 
despite the significant differences between them.  More precisely, the state refers to 
public institutions, differentiated from other social institutions and exercising sovereignty 
within a given territory; the nation refers to a cultural, political, or historical bond uniting 
a community.15 
In addition to the explanation of the state and nation, Anthony Smith develops the 
fundamental features of national identity: 
• A historic territory or homeland. 
• Common myths and historical memories. 
• A common, mass public culture.16 
These features are examined in this thesis to determine which are necessary and 
critical for Ukraine and which have remained undeveloped.  Smith suggests that nations 
and nationalism cannot be completely understood simply as a form of politics or an 
ideology.  Smith argues that nations and national identity must be treated as a cultural 
phenomenon also.  This task is to balance these dynamics.   
                                                 
15 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno:  University of Nevada Press, 1991), 14.  
16 Ibid, 14. 
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B. THEORIES ON THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY 
A conventional line of thought is that the nation-state is first born in the political 
awakening of a group of people, or the galvanization through ethnic repression or 
professed superiority of an ethnic group into a uniform national identity, finally 
empowering that group with a state of its own.  This very general idea provides a 
common theme and point of departure for general trends developed by many political 
scientists in the study of national identity:  the primordialists and the constructivists. 
1. Primordialism Theory 
Primordialists argue that the demand for a nation-state and separatism arises from 
the awakening of ethnic self-awareness.17  Primordialism is the argument that nations are 
grown from within and are a natural phenomenon.  The implication is that nations cannot 
be constructed, but rather nations and national identities are like plants that spring up, 
keeping with in their own specific divine laws.18  Additionally, primordial attachments 
rest on perception, cognition, and belief.19 
2. Constructivism Theory 
Constructivists argue that the process of national identity formation entails 
differences between ethnic groups becoming more intense and gaining more symbolic 
significance, resulting in a desire for group solidarity.20  Thus, constructivism suggests 
that ethnicity can be used by political elites to further their own agendas by mobilizing 
large portions of the population to support goals clad in ethnic or nationalist trappings.  
Constructivists start their analysis of national identity development from a modern 
standpoint; they suggest the nation is a malleable, modern cultural artifact.  
                                                 
17 Philip G. Roeder, Where Nation-States Come From:  Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2007), 22. 
18 Primordialism can be traced philosophically to the works of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803).  
He linked national identity and people, not ethnically, but by language and literature.  Hagen Schulze, 
States, Nations, and Nationalism (Oxford:  Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 156-157.   
19 Anthony D. Smith, The Nation in History:  Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and 
Nationalism (Hanover:  University Press of New England, 2000), 21. 
20 Roeder, 22-23. 
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Constructivists also see nations as the result of struggle and suggest that modernization 
and industrialization drew old isolated groups into larger societies.  Furthermore, in these 
societies, the political elites orchestrated the transition from isolated loyalty-based 
identities into tradition-based organizations as part of a larger social structure.   
There is no consensus among scholars to support either theory as the best model 
to explain national identity formation.  Alexander Motyl suggests that the centerpiece of 
the constructivist approach—the proposition that national identity is constructed by elites 
acting in a self-consciously constructivist manner—is at best highly problematic, 
especially as elites mobilize populations to support their struggle for power.21   
In his Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict In and After the Soviet Union, Valery 
Tishkov argues that there are several institutions, interest groups, and political 
entrepreneurs struggling for power.  Often these political entrepreneurs are interested in 
mobilizing the people by highlighting ethnic or nationalistic issues.  Tishkov 
demonstrates that the Russian (and Soviet) social science tradition is heavily dominated 
by the primordial approach with respect to the interpretation of ethnicity or nationality.  
Ethnicity is seen as a given; an ethnic group as a social phenomenon.  Even post-Soviet 
scholars have remained strongly attached to this primordial vision.  Following many 
Western scholars Tishkov argues for a more constructivist approach:  ethnicity as a 
means employed by a mass in an effort to gain material or political advantages in the 
social arena and ethnicity based on academic and political myths that are created, 
propagated, and often manipulated by elites seeking recognition and power.22 
Despite the differences in the explanation, both models above contribute some 
helpful generalizations; neither the primordialists nor the constructivists should be wholly 
rejected or accepted.  The helpful generalizations are: 
1. A sense of belonging to a larger group can evolve over time, whether it 
is organic or constructed. 
                                                 
21 Alexander J. Motyl, Revolutions, Nations, Empires:  Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities 
(New York:  Columbia University Press, 1999), 74. 
22 Valery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict In and After the Soviet Union (London:  Sage, 
1997).  55. 
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2. Historical memories based on actual events or myths strengthen 
national identity. 
3. A historical homeland is critical to national identity.  The actual 
location of this homeland is also as important as the homeland itself.  
From these generalizations, we can generate a working definition of a nation as a 
group united by a common mass culture, sharing a historic homeland or territory, with 
shared memories and myths.  Thus a national identity is multifaceted and cannot be 
reduced to a single dynamic element.  This definition also sets the nation apart from the 
state.  In fact, in recent history only about 10 percent of states could claim to be true 
nation-states in the sense that the state’s boundaries coincide with the nation’s and that 
the total population of the state share a single ethnic culture.23   In the case of modern 
Poland, the boundaries of the state coincide with boundaries of the nation, and the total 
population is about 98 percent Polish.24  Whereas the boundaries of modern Ukraine do 
not coincide with the Ukrainian nation, and the total population includes almost 25 
percent  of non-Ukrainian ethnic groups.25 
The generalizations listed above also lead to the development of a third, more 
moderate theory to help explain national identity development. 
3. Ethnosymbolism Theory 
These critiques of primordialism and constructivism give the basis for a third 
theory, a popular “middle way.”  This in-between theory is championed by Anthony 
Smith, who, following the Hegelian dialectic, proposes a synthesis of primordialist and 
constructivist views, now commonly referred to as ethnosymbolism.  According to Smith, 
in addition to the fundamental features of national identity listed above, Smith also argues 
that nations are formed through the inclusion of the whole populace, not only the elites; 
                                                 
23  Walker Connor, “A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 7 
(1978):  378-400. 
24George Sanford, Overcoming the Burden of History in Polish Foreign Policy, (Portland, Oregon:  
Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 197.  
25 All Ukrainian Population Census, 2001.  http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/ (accessed 15 October 
2007).   
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constitution of legal and political institutions; nationalist ideology, international 
recognition and drawing up of borders.  Smith stresses the importance of treating the 
history of collective cultural identities over time. 
Taken together, these theories have the potential to clarify the successes and 
failures of national identity development in general and to provide a deeper 
understanding to the problem of national identity in state building in Ukraine and Poland.  
The major debate between primordialists and constructivists falls into place with a 
distinction that national identity is more complex than ethnicity.  Ethnosymbolism points 
to ways in which early collective memories may be related to modern nations while 
allowing for certain historical discontinuities (such as the disappearance of the Polish 
home land for over a century). 
C. NATIONAL IDENTITY IN POST-COMMUNIST AREAS 
There is a significant literature focused on ethnic issues, national identity, and the 
influence of these issues on the post-communist countries of central and eastern Europe.  
Well-known contributors include such scholars as Valerie Bunce, Taras Kuzio, Anthony 
Smith, Alexander Motyl, Illya Prizel, Roman Szporluk, George Y. Shevelov, Mikhail 
Molchanov, Andrew Wilson, and Volodymyr Zviglyanich.  Most works by these authors 
was accomplished after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and acknowledged the 
evolving world order.  They suggest a security vacuum, especially in the democratization 
process and formation of market economies, in the absence of the previously relatively 
stable bi-polar world of the Cold War 
Valerie Bunce suggests that scholars make national identity a key aspect of the 
study of democratic transition in post-communist Europe.  However, her call to her 
fellow scholars fell on deaf ears.26  Five years later, Taras Kuzio echoes Bunce’s position 
in Politics, by stating that few scholars of post-communist transition have sought to 
develop a framework that includes national identity.27  When discussing post-communist 
                                                 
26 Valerie Bunce, “Should Transitologist Be Grounded?” Slavic Review 54 (1995):  111-127. 
27 Taras Kuzio, “Transition in Postcommunist States:  Triple or Quadruple?”  Politics 21 (2001):  101-
110. 
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transition, scholars often only address the problem of creating a market economy 
simultaneously with democratization, rarely do they discuss nation-building. 
Andrew Wilson began to fill a scholarly gap and examined Ukrainian national 
identity, arguing that Ukrainian national identity was never able to emerge as a mass 
phenomenon with lasting political impact.28    Modern Ukraine inherited from the Soviet 
Union regional, historical, ethnic, linguistic and religious differences within the 
Ukrainian state boundary that severely limit the potential for a modern Ukrainian national 
identity to emerge and created conditions for a sharp polarization in Ukrainian society.   
For all the scholarly work on national identity generally, particular questions of 
national identity in the modernization of former Soviet states remain a developing field.  
Although there is diverse body of work on nationalism, literature on the role of national 
identity in the formation of how a state defines itself and interacts with other state actors 
remains in an embryonic state as the scholars who study each components rarely cross 
pollinate.  Ilya Prizel notes that sociologists and political scientists who study national 
identity rarely venture into foreign affairs; conversely, historians rarely follow the 
process of national identity over a long period of time, except nationalistic outbursts that 
result in catastrophic events.29   
The focus here falls on root causes of the development of a national identity, 
factors that lead to success or failure.  Finally, this thesis identifies which national 
identity development factors are lacking in Ukraine, why they are lacking and practical 
implications to political problems that may result. 
 
 
                                                 
28Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s:  A Minority Faith (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1996).  
29 Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 7. 
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III. POLISH CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Certainly in the context of an emergent central European democracy with a solid 
and functional national identity, Poland provides a paradigmatic case, with special 
urgency for Ukraine. 
Poland lies in central Europe between Russia and Germany; this location, with no 
geographic obstacles to east-west transit, contributed to an especially turbulent history. 
Its situation between the Carpathian Mountains and the Baltic Sea also explains Poland 
being influenced by ten centuries of major migrations and conflicts as well as economic 
and social upheavals experienced in Europe since the Middle Ages. Poland took shape 
near the middle of the tenth century.  Its golden age occurred in the sixteenth century.  
Thereafter, the strengthening of the gentry and internal disorders weakened the empire.  
The loss of independence and partitioning of Poland by Russia, Prussia, and Austria from 
1795 to 1918—as well as the “fourth partition” under Nazi occupation and genocide 
during World War II—contributed to massive population shifts and political boundary 
changes.  Today, as a result, internal ethnic cleavages have ended, allowing Poland to 
emerge by the 1990s as a relatively homogeneous state.30 
Although one of the oldest states in Europe, Poland of today is in many ways a 
new nation.31  First, Poland has very little of what can be called a “usable past” that can 
be a basis for a new international role and national identity.32  Through all the crises in 
Poland’s past, no institutions persist on which to anchor a Polish national identity.  Thus, 
the national identity depended on the collective memories of elites as well as history and 
literature—a stylized but also malleable take on the national past.   
                                                 
30 Lonnie R. Johnson, Central Europe:  Enemies, Neighbors, Friends (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 1996), 252-253. 
31 Aleksander Gieysztor, et al., History of Poland (Warszawa:  PWN-Polish Scientific Publishers, 
1979), 23. 
32 Tony Judt, “The Unmastered Future:  What prospects for Eastern Europe,” Tikkun 5 (1990):  11-18.  
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Due to Poland’s turbulent history, it developed as, or as a part of, a multi-national 
empire.  As a result, the elites of Poland developed an identity that was linked to this 
multi-national empire.33  Not until the end of World War II did this collective memory 
spread beyond the social and political elites to perpetuate an idea of Poland.  Finally, the 
idea of a Polish national identity spread to the masses, but was not fully implemented 
until the emergence of an independent Poland in the 1990s. 
B. POLANIE:  NATIONAL ORIGINS 
Poland’s quest for its place in the world following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union has engaged Poles at all social and political levels—key to Smith’s 
ethnosymbolism and the overall success of the Polish example. 
To be sure, the evolution of Poland’s national identity is complicated by its 
geography and geographic location.  At different times in its past, Poland has been known 
as the “bulwark of Christianity,” the “Western bastion of the Slavs,” or the “bridge 
between East and West.”34  Over the millennium since Poland took shape, the territory 
ruled by Poland has shifted as greatly as its role.  However, most scholars agree that a 
people called Polanie35settled in an area that became the core of the Polish homeland 
bounded by the Oder river in the West to the Vistula River in the east and south to the 
Carpathian mountains. 
 Authority over this territory was exercised by hereditary rulers; a successful 
dynasty was established by a somewhat mythical individual known as Piast. Under the 
leadership of the Piast dynasty, the Polanie had withstood the decades of onslaught from 
the Imperial armies.  Moreover, by the later half of the tenth century, in an attempt to 
gain support against the Roman Empire, prince Mieszko, duke of the Slavic tribe of 
Polanie, converted to Christianity and married a Czech princess in 966.  This act had 
tremendous political implications, as Poland officially appeared on the Christian 
                                                 
33 Prizel, 2-7.   
34 Gieysztor, et al., 17. 
35 Polanie – commonly defined as a group of people that were “dwellers of the field or plain.”  The 
polanie will be discussed in greater detail in next section. 
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European maps and is generally recognized as the birth of Poland.  Miesko had built 
Poland into one of the strongest powers in Eastern Europe.36 
 
 
Figure 1.   Poland, 980-101837 
 
By 997, Mieszko’s son, Boleslaw the Brave, built on his father’s achievements 
and united all the provinces that eventually came to make up the traditional territory of 
Poland.  Boleslaw the Brave united the Slavs in Lusatia, Moravia, and Slovakia into one 
large state to meet the threat of encroachment by German feudal lords on Poland’s 
western border (Fig 1.).  However, even at this early stage, due to a lack of a unified 
identity, these Slav lands were only briefly under his control.  Throughout his life, 
Boleslaw implored Rome for a royal crown.  Finally, in 1025 he was crowned King of 
                                                 
36 Johnson, 22. 
37 Map downloaded from WHKMLA Historic Atlas:    
(http://www.zum.de/whkmla/histatlas/eceurope/poland9801018.gif)  accessed 10 October 2007. 
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Poland with the Pope’s blessing.  This coronation was an important step on the road to a 
consolidated Polish identity as a true kingdom with sovereign territory.38 
Boleslaw the Brave died shortly after being crowned, and Poland fell into a period 
of crisis.  Although there were occasionally strong energetic rulers that were able to fight 
off the German invasions from the West, the earlier stronger kingdom of Boleslaw the 
Brave disintegrated into a number of smaller feudal organizations, ruled by local Piast 
princes.39  During this period, the city of Krakow became important and possession of 
that city was perceived as necessary to rule over the whole territory.  Furthermore, during 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the contending petty duchies were continuously 
threatened by expansionist policies of German lords, but more importantly, virtually all 
this territory was devastated by the Mongol incursion into Europe and this area fell under 
Mongol bondage. 
This period also saw one of the most fateful events in Polish history in 1226 when 
a regional prince invited the crusading Order of Teutonic Knights to Poland.  The 
Teutonic Knights were allowed to settle in an area northeast of Krakow in exchange for 
protection from raids by pagan Prussian.  However, the protector presently became the 
threat; by 1288, the Teutonic Knights conquered the Prussians and secured their foothold 
in the area, now posing a threat to the territory of Poland. 
The lack of a consolidated Polish identity could not have gone on much longer 
without permanent implications.  Faced by threats on all sides, King Wladyslaw Lokietek 
managed to consolidate the core state together centered on Krakow.  One of his other 
great achievements was to defeat the Teutonic Order.  With the support of the German 
Empire, the Teutonic Knights dramatically increased their holdings, but when their 
attention turned south, the Polish forces under Lokietek defeated them.  This victory 
brought present-day Belarus and Ukraine into the Polish sphere of influence. 
By the late fourteenth century, the Polish King Casmir died without leaving an 
heir.  It was finally agreed that his nephew, Louis, Hungarian of the d’Anjou dynasty, 
                                                 
38 Stanford, 3. 
39 Gieysztor, et al., 19. 
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would be crowned king of Poland.  His rule was brief and he left only two young 
daughters.  The younger daughter, Jadwiga, was proclaimed Queen of Poland and 
married by arrangement to Jogaila, the Lithuanian ruler.  This event had the result of 
joining Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania into semi-permanent union, which became 
known as the Jagiellonian dynasty.   
The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries marked the height of the Jagiellonian 
dynasty—considered a ‘Golden Age’ by most Poles.40  This dynasty proved beneficial to 
Poles and Lithuanians, who comprised one of the most powerful empires in Europe.  At 
its peak, this empire controlled territory of the present day Baltic States, Belarus, 
Ukraine, and Poland (Fig 2.).  This regional concept of Poland has remained powerfully 
imprinted on the Polish collective memory.41 
 
 
Figure 2.   Poland, 15th century42 
 
                                                 
40 Stanford, 4. 
41 Johnson, 46-49. 
42 Map downloaded from The University of Texas Libraries: 
(http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/europe_15th_colbeck.jpg) accessed 10 October 2007. 
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Polish independence ended in a series of partitions by Russia, Prussia, and 
Austria.  The First Partition took place in 1772 when Fredrick the Great consolidated 
Prussia by annexing the Polish territories between East Prussia and Western Pomerania 
(Fig 3.).  The Austrians seized the southwestern slice of Poland, including Krakow.  
Catherine the Great of Russia annexed the northeast.   
 
Figure 3.   First Partition of Poland, 177243 
 
The Second Partition occurred in 1793 when Catherine the Great mobilized her 
armies against Poland.  Poland sought an alliance with Fredrick the Great’s successor, but 
the Prussians instead seized more Polish territory (Fig 4.).  Poland’s final attempt to 
maintain independence was a result of a sense of nationalistic winds blowing across 
Europe.  The leader of this movement, Tadeusz Kosciuszko, understood that an 
independence movement had to come from a unified national identity.  However, the 
combined forces of Russia and Prussia were too strong, resulting in the Third Partition of 
Poland in 1795 (Fig 5.).44  The state of Poland disappeared from the map not to return 
until 1918, a period of 123 years. 
                                                 
43 Map downloaded from The Encyclopedia Britannica:  
(http://www.britannica.com/eb/thumb?id=3555) accessed 10 October 2007.  
44 Gieysztor, et al., 325-332.  
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Figure 4.   Second Partition of Poland, 179345 
 
 
Figure 5.   Third Partition of Poland, 179546 
 
It has often been pointed out that the key feature of the partition period was that 
the Polish nation not only survived but became culturally and socially stronger despite 
                                                 
45 Map downloaded from The Encyclopedia Britannica:  
(http://www.britannica.com/eb/thumb?id=3555) accessed 10 October 2007. 
46 Ibid. 
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the loss of independence.47  The quest for national independence was linked with 
Romanticism in Polish culture such as the music of Chopin and the literature of Joachim 
Lelwel, who developed powerful national myths which sustained Polish national identity 
and were instilled in Polish children.  The image of a defeated Poland among nations, 
whose suffering would be rewarded with independence, reinforced the notion that the 
Polish nation represented civilization against eastern barbarianism.  The tendency for 
Poles to see their nation and society as a culture of glorious defeat (similar to the World 
War II period and communist period) has only recently been eased with the 
modernization involving full sovereignty and democratization after 1989.  
Poland regained its independence in 1918 only to be overrun by Germany and the 
Soviet Union in World War II.  In 1939, Germany and Russia signed the Ribbentrop-
Molotov non-aggression pact which secretly provided for the dismemberment of Poland.  
Following World War II, the Yalta agreement stipulated free elections, but those held in 
1947 were controlled by the Communist Party.  The Polish government-in-exile existed 
until 1990, and although its influence was degraded, it served as the custodian of the 
independent Polish identity. 
Over its 1000 year history, Poland has been a loose patchwork of feudal duchies, 
a consolidated ethnically Slav-based federation, a multi-national empire, eradicated from 
the map, and an oppressed state.  However, through that turbulent history, the Polish 
national identity persisted.  Anthony Smith argues that it is the dislocation of the elites 
(perhaps nobility in the early history of Poland) and creation of a national identity based 
in the masses.48  The Poles outside the nobility were considered part of the Polish 
national fabric and the concept of Polish national identity became a persisting nineteenth 
century concept, ensuring the nation’s rebirth.49  Thus, the ten centuries of geographic  
 
 
                                                 
47 Piotr S. Wandycz, The Lands of Partitioned Poland (Seattle:  University of Washington Press, 
1975).   
48 Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (New York:  Holms & Meier, 1983).   
49 University at Buffalo, State University of New York, “History of Poland”                        
http://www.info-poland.buffalo.edu/  (accessed October 2007). 
 23 
turmoil and territorial upheaval, indeed, even the loss of a physical Polish state all 
contributed to strengthening the Polish national identity.  The concept of Polish national 
identity lived on in the Polish people.   
C. COMMON MYTHS AND HISTORICAL MEMORIES 
In addition to historic territory, Anthony Smith suggests that a national identity is 
a result of how it interprets its own history, beliefs, and perceptions. 
1. Myths and Memories  
Beliefs, perceptions, and memories inherently develop over time.  Since the 
collective memories of societies are inconsistent and selective, using collective memory 
to define the national identity is dependent to whom in society maintains the collective 
memory.  Indeed, after Poland lost its independence, the key ingredient in the formation 
of Polish national identity was the creation of a national myth to reconstitute an 
independent Polish state.50 Of particular importance to the successful development of 
Polish national identity are myths about memories of homeland origin and symbols. 
2. Origins of Poland 
The true origins of Poland have been lost in the mists of time, but several legends 
tell of the country’s beginning.  A mythologized version tells of three brothers, Lech, 
Czech, and Rus, each set off in a different direction with their tribe.  Lech goes to the 
west.  As he came to a clearing in a forest, he noticed a nest of a white eagle.  The legend 
goes that as the eagle was flying over their heads; it spread its wings and soared to the 
heavens.  As the eagle was soaring, a ray of sunshine from the setting red sun illuminated 
the eagle’s wings so they appeared tipped in gold, contrasting with the pure white of the 
rest of the bird.  Lech decided to settle there with his tribe.  He named the place Gniezno, 
while the followers became known as Polanie, which means “field dwellers.”  The eagle 
became a symbol of his tribe.  To this day a white eagle against a red background is the 
official emblem of Poland (Fig 6.).  
                                                 
50 Prizel, 54-55. 
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Figure 6.   The Polish Eagle51 
 
This myth is critical for the persistence of the Polish national identity because it 
gives a common, honorable origin to the Polish people, but it also gives a powerful 
symbol to rally around and with which to identify.  Also, nations derive their sense of 
identity from a myth of common ancestry, which is reflected in this Polish myth.  
Moreover, it is also interaction with the outside world, primarily the acceptance or 
rejection of “the other” that allows a nation to develop and maintain a sense of national 
uniqueness. 
3. Rejection of “The Other” 
In addition to the creation of national myths, another key ingredient in the 
formation of Polish national was a sense of grievance against “the other.”52  Nationalism 
scholars argue that a common cultural or constitutional bond is the primary source of 
                                                 
51 Image downloaded from The Polish Institute:  (http://www.polishinstitute.org.il/English/info.htm) 
accessed 10 October 2007. 
52 Prizel, 54-55. 
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national identity, but often it is conflict with an outside power that drives national identity 
development.  While armed conflict is the most obvious contact with “the other,” it is a 
sustained contact with other groups that stirs this awareness.  Often it is recognition of 
this contact that is used by historians to build or sustain a national identity by contrast.  
For example, the myth of a beautiful Polish queen who chose to kill herself rather than 
marry a German or the myth of trumpeter watchman who alerted the Poles of coming 
Mongol danger. 
a. Wanda, the Polish Queen 
A Polish queen named Wanda, was very beautiful with wisdom and 
understanding far beyond her years.  With all her qualities, her beauty and her wisdom, 
many princes sought to marry her, but Wanda would accept none of them, for she had not 
yet found one who was pleasing to her and who would help her to rule wisely and well 
over her beloved country. Poland was dear to Wanda, above all else, and she spared no 
effort to make her people happy. She waged war against aggressors who tried to invade 
her country, herself leading her soldiers in the battlefield.   
Wanda's fame spread far and wide, and even a German prince, named 
Rytigier, heard of her beauty, her valor and, what was even more attractive to him, he 
heard that the lands of Poland were fruitful and rich.  He therefore sent messengers with a 
letter to Wanda.  The messengers were received at Wanda's court with courtesy and 
hospitality, as was always the custom in Poland.  It was noticed that they were rough, 
uncivilized men who seemed surprised at the luxury and comfort of Wanda's Court. After 
they had rested and changed their apparel, they were ushered into Wanda's presence. 
Although on the face of it they seemed respectful, they looked about them with an air of 
appraising the value of everything they saw before them, as though it would soon be 
theirs. 
Wanda read the letter and turned deathly pale. The contents were clear 
enough; Rytigier asked her for her hand in marriage, stipulating that as her dowry she 
should bring him the lands of Poland, and threatening war in the event of a refusal.  To  
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accept Rytigier's proposal of marriage was unthinkable; Wanda could not, would not 
subject her country to a German rule.  She had made her decision. Wanda would sacrifice 
her life for Poland. 
She retired to her private quarters and there prayed to the gods that they 
would grant Poland freedom from the Germans in return for her sacrificing her life. Her 
prayer was granted, and Wanda threw herself into the river Vistula. When her body was 
recovered, she was buried with all honors, and a mound was raised to her memory beside 
that of her father, Krakus. 
b. Trumpeter Watchman 
In Krakow, the ancient capital of Poland, there is a Church in the Market 
Square.  It is a tall, graceful building built of brick, in the Gothic style, with a richly 
adorned interior.  It had two towers, one of which is a little higher than the other and 
more ornate. From the taller tower a fanfare is played by a trumpeter, every hour.  It is 
repeated four times, but always ends abruptly, on a broken note. Here is the legend 
behind this tradition: 
One day in the thirteenth century, an old watchman, keeping watch over 
the city of Krakow saw in the distance a large army of Tatars galloping towards the city.  
These invaders from the east had more than once advanced to Krakow and even farther, 
and they had pillaged and burned, looted and murdered and carried off the people to be 
slaves.  
There was only one thing the trumpeter watchman could do.  He must play 
the Hejnal, over and over.  So he played, again and again. At first the people of Krakow 
were puzzled, but eventually they realized that an attack was imminent.  The Polish 
archers began arriving and rained down arrows on the Tartars.  Eventually the Tartars 
were forced to retreat, and Krakow was saved from the Mongols! 
However, a single Tartar arrow had pierced the old watchman’s throat and 
he had died.  The trumpet was still clasped in his hands ready to blast out a final note. 
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The Kracovians never forgot the act of the old trumpeter watchman, and it 
was decreed that a bugle call should be played each day in memory of the hero. Thus, for 
hundreds of years the hejnal has rung out over Krakow's rooftops for the noble watchman 
who saved the city. 
4. King Boleslaw the Brave 
When King Boleslaw died, Poland lost a very able and brave ruler, one who had 
united her and made her into a really great country.  One legend claims that Boleslaw, 
and his Knights who fought with him for he was a great warrior and earned his title of the 
Brave, by routing Poland's enemies he went into a mountain called Giewont. This 
mountain forms part of the Tatra mountain range, and its shape, if seen from a certain 
angle, is like the head of a sleeping Knight.  Within the mountain is a huge dark cavern 
and there sleeps King Boleslaw and his Knights. They are mounted on horses, with their 
swords, bow and lances beside them. And if Poland ever needs them, then someone must 
awake them, and they will ride forth to serve the Polish nation. 
Boleslaw the Brave is an important part of Polish mythology as it links the 
modern Poles to essentially the first leader to consolidate lands into an independent 
Poland.  This myth also links the uniting force of Boleslaw the Brave with Lech Walesa, 
who united nearly one-third the population under the trade union movement know as 
Solidarity.  The Solidarity movement accelerated the “de-Sovietization” of Poland.  
Boleslaw the Brave’s uniting of the Slaves to defeat the Germans is reverberated in the 
Walesa-led uniting of Poland under Solidarity to defeat communism, once more giving 
Poland its freedom.  
D. DIVERSE AND CHANGING ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF POLAND 
National identity serves as a link between society and the world while a common 
mass culture serves as a link between the individual and the society.  Indeed, a sense of 
national identity provides a powerful means of defining and locating individuals in the 
world through the lens of a shared, unique culture that enables a society to “know who 
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they are in the world.”53  Mass culture is often a critical component of successful national 
identity development.  Nations derive their sense of identity from cultural components 
such as religion and ethnicity 
1.  Ethnicity 
Poland’s multinational diversity was due to domination by the Russian, Austrian, 
and Prussian empires during the Partitions of Poland.  Only two institutions preserved 
Polish national identity throughout it turbulent past:  the Roman Catholic Church and the 
national elite.54  However, from the disappearance of the Polish state in 1795 to its 
reappearance after World War I, there was a redefinition of the notion of Polish culture.  
The redefinition was not originally ethnic or religious but was grounded in the collective 
memory of the culture of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.  Once the nation 
realized the old Commonwealth would not be recreated, the notion of Polish national 
identity became based on a civilization, uniting Poles living across parceled lands.  They 
would be united by Polish culture, defined by Polish language and customs.  However, by 
the dawn of the twentieth century, the notion of Polish culture shifted to one of ethnicity 
and the myth of Polish unity. 
The Entente Powers’ to reestablish an independent Polish state at the end of 
World War I was contentious at best.  The state that eventually emerged was an 
exceptionally diverse society, divided across many lines (Fig 7.).  However, the Polish 
national identity was still primarily held in the collective memory of a few elites.  
 
 
                                                 
53 Smith, National Identity, 16-17.  
54 Johnson, 132-133. 
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Figure 7.   Post-World War I Poland55 
 
At the end of The Second World War, Poland was changed again.  Poland was 
moved west and its society changed from one of great diversity to one of great uniformity 
(Fig 8.).  Additionally, much to the prewar political, religious, and cultural elite, i.e. the 
historic custodians of Polish national memory, were killed or exiled.  World War II was a 
national war, involving every layer of Polish society.56  The new Polish society 
developed a different sense of Poland’s place in the world, the elite were gone and the 
Polish masses picked up the mantle to carry the Polish culture.  This tragedy forced Poles 
to accept the realities about the past and future and enabled the rapid development of a 






                                                 
55 Map downloaded from Ancestry:  The Polish Connection:  
(http://freepages.genealogy.rootsweb.com/~atpc/maps/poland-1919.jpg)  accessed 10 October 2007. 
56 Sanford, 11-13. 
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Ethnic minorities are now very small, making up less than two percent of the 
overall population (compared with about 30 percent during the interwar period):  about 
300,000 Ukrainians, 300,000 Belarusians, 12,000 Lithuanians, and less than 6,000 Jews  
(only 2,000 belong to a religious community).57  Minorities in Poland have been treated 




Figure 8.   Post World War II Poland58 
 
Poland’s transformation after 1989 was made up of two dimensions:  the first was 
a shift away from communism and towards democracy and the European markets; and 
the second was a return to pre-communists traditions.  For the first time since the Golden 
Age of the Jagiellonian dynasty, 1989 represented a return of strong and united elite.  
This is centered on the transformation towards democratic capitalism.  As in France, the 
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Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 197-197. 
58 Map downloaded from Ancestry:  The Polish Connection:  
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Polish movement has strong linguistic and cultural implications highlighted by historical  
memories.  Poland’s historical struggle to regain and maintain independence integrated 
cultural and linguistic factors within a form of democracy, but without degenerating into 
a purely ethnic form.59 
2.   Religion 
Poland’s evolution of a national identity has been hampered by its geographic 
location.  It is located at the intersection of three branches of Christianity:  Catholicism, 
Orthodoxy and Lutheranism.  Poland also was home to more than half the world’s Jewish 
population as well.60  In post-1989 Poland, the Catholic majority favored a conservative 
isolation.  However, this was tempered with Pope John Paul II’s views expressed in 1997 
that the Church should work for an open, moral Europe. 
E. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND MODERNIZATION 
Economically, national identity supports stipulates control and use of territorial 
resources.  However, the argument heretofore suggests that Poland has little “usable past” 
and any past it does have was in the repository of a small elite.  This argument is only a 
partial view.  Poland has been building on positive aspects of its past, such as the 
eighteenth century Kosciuszko uprising and the nineteenth century struggles for 
independence.  The importance of historical factors is augmented by the unparalleled 
speed of modernization during World War II and the current Europeanization in the form 
of market reforms. 
In the aftermath of World War II, the linking of Poland’s economy to Nazi 
Germany’s military-industrial complex resulted in significant and rapid industrialization 
of Poland, which previous attempts at industrialization had actually caused rifts in Polish 
society.61 
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As the Polish national identity emerged at the end of the Cold War, it became 
apparent that in order to facilitate its long-term economic prosperity, Poland would need 
to integrate itself into Western Europe.  The ability of Poland to develop an enduring 
consolidated national identity has allowed policy makers to adopt a “return to Europe” 
direction. 
Poland crossed a dangerous transitional period from the fall of communism to its 
integration in the Euro-Atlantic system.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The case of Poland demonstrates that neither the primordialist nor constructivist 
approach should be used entirely nor rejected wholly to understand the process of Polish 
national identity development.  In fact, it is the ethnosymbolic theory that can best be 
used to explain the success of Polish national identity formation.  The Polish nation 
regained a distinctive ethnic and territorial identity when the borders were adjusted at the 
close of World War II.  The research shows that the process of developing a national 
identity in Poland is similar to the process in European countries, where the national 
identity was based on peoples sense of belonging to a larger group within a historic 
homeland. 
The current Polish national identity also represents a convergence of the value of 
anti-communist independence along with post-1989 economic reform that produced 
widespread support among the masses for the elite view of a ‘return to Europe.’  
As indicated above, Poland has had an exceptionally turbulent history, marked by 
loss of independence, severe threats during World War II as well as the communist era.  
Poland’s persistent national identity is due in part to its geographical position between 
more powerful Russia and Germany.  Poland is a historic nation with an indigenous elite 
and a powerful sense of cultural distinctiveness.  However, this collective memory 
remained for a long period of time in the custody of small social and political elite that 
sustained the idea of Poland:  one based in a commonwealth with Lithuania that covered 
areas now known as Ukraine and Belarus.  It was not until the modern era that the Polish 
national idea spread to the popular consciousness, a key element in Anthony Smith’s 
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ethnosymbolism theory.  Indeed, Poland has developed an enduring, collective national 
identity with the elites and the masses sharing common national cultural attributes.  Thus, 
the development of Polish national identity was dependent on the transfer of the 
collective memory from the elite to the masses.   
In the absence of the state for over 120 years, the nation and the national 
collective memory became the primary container for Polish history and forming Polish 
identity.  Moreover, it was this domination by foreign rulers that cemented Polish 
loyalties to provincial regions and developed into an abstract notion of the “nation.” 
Ethnosymbolism also stresses the importance of examining the histories and 
cultural identities over long periods of time.  Poland was able to develop and maintain a 
common national identity because of its center of gravity, that is, the collective memory 
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IV. UKRAINIAN CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, this thesis identified factors that led to the emergence of a 
strong and consolidated Polish national identity that paved the way for “‘return to 
Europe’” for Polish policymakers.  The Polish case study indicates that Poland was able 
to develop a consolidated and coherent national identity from within, based on an 
ethnically homogenous population with a shared historical memory, shared religion, 
common language, a well-defined territory, and a common mass culture. 
Ukraine’s national identity development differs in significant ways from the 
Polish experience.  Poland possessed a political elite, a distinct language, a historic 
homeland, and a common collective memory.  Ukraine lacked these unifying aspects.  As 
such a Ukrainian national identity did not fully emerge until the end of the nineteenth 
century, and even then, national independence was viewed as unattainable.  Indeed, even 
after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the appearance of an independent Ukraine 
was unexpected my many scholars and analyst due to the ill-defined Ukrainian identity, 
making Ukraine an unlikely candidate for statehood. 
Ukraine today has all the attributes of a state, but a consolidated national identity 
remains elusive.  This chapter seeks to analyze interpretations of the history of the 
Ukrainian people, ethnic composition, religious affiliation, and regional loyalties to 
determine which factors are most important for national identity.  Where Poland was able 
to develop a national identity from within, Ukrainian national identity has been hindered 
by internal and external factors. 
B. KIEVAN RUS’:  NATIONAL ORIGINS 
The contest for the inheritance of Kievan Rus’ represents one of the oldest bones 
of contention in Russian-Ukrainian cultural and political relations.  This contest began 
among the Eastern Slavs in the second half of the eleventh century and culminated in the 
famous controversy between the “Northerners” and “Southerners,” that is between 
Russians and Ukrainians.  The controversy over who is the legitimate heir to the Kievan 
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tradition continues to the present day in the form of Russian ideological campaigns 
waged to sow the seeds of discord between Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the East and 
South and the nationally conscious Ukrainians in the West.  This has a profound impact 
on the development of Ukrainian national identity, cultural self-perception, historical 
awareness, national consciousness, and national mythology. 
The points at issue between the Ukrainian nationalists and Russian nationalists 
extend from the ninth century through the Middle Ages and the Russian Empire 
concluding in the Soviet Era.  As witnessed in other multinational states in the 1990s, 
often the most bitter insults that nationalists can hurl at each other are not drawn from 
contemporary disputes, but rather from historical crimes and suffering.  Obviously, the 
Ukrainian population is less affected by these sentiments than Yugoslavia, but as the 
Polish model demonstrated in the previous chapter, a shared history, mythology, and 
homeland are all critical ingredients to formulating an enduring, consolidated national 
identity. 
Starting in the ninth century, East Slavic tribes come under the rule of the 
Varangians, Scandinavian warriors and traders.  The ruler of Novgorod, Riurik, gave his 
name to the subsequent dynasty of Kievan Rus’.  By 878, Oleg Helgi, a Varangian prince 
of Novgorod, captured Kiev and makes it his seat of power.  The lands under his control 
came to be called ‘Rus.’ Vladimir the Great ruled from 980 to 1015 and converted his 
domain from paganism to Orthodox Christianity as a means of unifying a diverse 
population.  (After considering other options from among the predominant religions of 
the day, including Islam, Vladimir followed his preference for Byzantine culture and 
oriented his kingdom squarely towards the Byzantines.)  In 1037, the Orthodox 
metropolinate of Kiev was founded.  The area of Kiev’s domination covered present-day 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia west of the Ural Mountains (Fig 9.).  The Kievan polity 
began to disintegrate starting in the eleventh century.   
During their great sweep of Eastern Europe, the Mongols rode up before the gates 
of Kiev in the thirteenth century.  Originally—and uncharacteristically for this 
campaign—the Mongols meant to capture the city, the largest Christian center they had 
yet encountered, without bloodshed.  However, the warriors of the Golden Horde had 
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been preceded by their reputation.  After the terror-struck Kievans killed General 
Subatai’s envoys and dropped their bodies over the city’s wooden walls, the Mongols 
destroyed it, galloping through the narrow stone streets in a murderous fury.  The gold-
domed chapel of St. Sophia was one of the few buildings to survive the onslaught, with a 
few burghers and clerics hidden in its underground vaults, though the invaders stole or 
destroyed most of the chapel’s treasures and relics.  Five years after the Mongol attack, 
visitors to Kiev reported the plains around the city were still strewn with human remains; 




Figure 9.   Kievan Rus’ 11th century62 
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(http://updatecenter.britannica.com/eb/image?binaryId=3844&rendTypeId=4)  accessed 10 October 2007. 
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The historical acrimony between Ukraine and Russia begins with the Mongol 
invasion.  In part in response to the Kievan example—though political interests figured as 
well—the princes of Novgorod and Moscow (brothers, in fact) took a more quiescent 
tack with the Mongols.  The years of Mongol domination saw the advent of Moscow as 
the social and cultural focal point of the region.  Whether or not the Muscovy princes 
actively aided the invaders in their destruction of Kiev, the results and ramifications of 
the event provided the basis of the bad feeling that has worked its way into the problem 
of Ukrainian national identity.  
Who can claim to be the legitimate heir to which legacy of Kievan Rus’?  There 
are three schools of thought or historical interpretation forwarded by modern scholars 
about the inheritance of Kievan Rus’.  One version favors the Russian claim, while 
another rejects anything but Ukrainian identity.  The third school, current in the Soviet 
Union, sought to combine the two competing ideas, though to the ends of the regime’s 
ideology and doctrine on ethnicities and nationality. 
1. Exclusive Russian National History 
This theory was developed in the eighteenth century and continued to the Russian 
national-imperial school in the nineteenth century.  Essentially, this theory relies on 
historical-ideological claims formed in Muscovy between 1330 and 1550.  This theory 
was based on the notion of the transfer of the religious institution of the Kievan 
metropolitan from Kiev to Moscow.  This represents the uninterrupted dynastic 
continuity of Riurik.63  This also is the basis for the Russian claim to be the true ethnic 
origin of all Slavs, including Ukrainians.  
2. Exclusive Ukrainian National History 
This theory was advanced by Ukrainian national historiography between the 
1840s and the 1930s.  The Ukrainians draw an uninterrupted dynastic line from Kiev to   
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Cossack Ukraine (Cossacks were a traditional community of people that inhabited the 
southern steppes of Eastern Europe) and utilized mainly territorial, ethnic, and social 
arguments.64 
3. Official Soviet Theory 
This theory gives equal rights to the three East Slav nations:  Russians, 
Ukrainians, and Belarusians.  However, even with the equal rights, this theory more 
closely resembles the Exclusive Russian National History theory and its forceful support 
of Russian national interests at the expense of the other two groups.  This theory also 
preferred research on Kievan Rus’ that was conducted in Russia, by Russian scholars. 
While many members of the Ukrainian and Russian populations view this issue 
with little interest, there is still much debate.  Among Ukrainians there is a perceived 
need to build up the historical bases for their statehood.  Many Ukrainians argue that 
Ukraine represents a continuity of ethnic and cultural traditions in the old Kievan Rus’ 
heartland and that Russians are descended from Finno-Ugric tribes.   Russians argue that 
Ukraine is the old Kievan territory, but the inhabitants were changed over the centuries 
by the impact of Lithuanian and Polish domination, implying that true Kievan culture was 
continued in Russia. 
The most extreme claim stemming from this suggestion is that the Ukrainians do 
not really exists as a nation and are merely “Little Russians.”  Most prominently, the 
imperial Russian state espoused this position until the Revolution.65  A milder version 
taught during the Soviet Era held the Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians as 
historically “brother nations,” all descending from Kievan Rus’ and closely linked by 
language, religion, culture, and a shared history. 
The years since Ukraine became independent from the Soviet Union have seen an 
increase in the number of interpretations of its history.  On the eve of Ukrainian 
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independence, the Ukrainian nomenklatura66 viewed its relationship with Moscow as a 
source of legitimacy.  However, following the rapid reforms in the Soviet Union, it 
became clear that association with Moscow threatened the elite’s hold onto power.  The 
Ukrainian elite shifted focus to supporting full independence.  Most Ukrainians supported 
independence, and most intellectuals believed Ukraine’s three centuries under Russian 
and Soviet rule unnaturally detached Ukraine from its natural cultural orbit, which was 
that of central Europe and not of the Russian influence.   
With this move toward independence, Marxism-Leninism was replaced by 
scientific nationalism.  However, the first government learned that the notion of Ukraine 
as part of central Europe did not sit well with large sectors of the population.  The 
Ukrainian government’s attempt to generate and revive national myths and symbols 
proved a painful process that deepened the cleavage over the essence of Ukrainian 
identity.67  This cleft was especially visible among the millions of Ukrainians that grew 
up during the Soviet era and believed Moscow to be the heir to Kievan Rus’ and believed 
in the “brother nations” concept.  Thus, another Ukrainian concept arose:  a “national 
Slavic concept.” 
The national Slavic concept, which began in the pro-Russian areas of eastern and 
southern Ukraine, differed from the Central European concept in several ways.  In 
general, the national Slavic concept believed in Ukraine’s distinct culture.  However, this 
concept also argues that regardless of which country is the heir to Kievan Rus’, Ukraine 
and Russia are bound by Orthodox Christianity, common ancestry, three hundred years of  
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common statehood, and such shared experiences as the tragedies of World War II.  As 
such, there is a commonality on many levels that can not simply be discarded for either 
Central Europe or the West.68 
The current cleavages in Ukraine are over the meaning of Ukrainian statehood 
and identity. As the Polish case study demonstrated, for the development of any 
contemporary consolidated enduring national identity, it is important to have common 
historical memories and myths that can help unify a nation.  Additionally, in the Polish 
case the carriers of the national identity were a small number of social and political elites, 
concerned with their national position relative neighboring states.  Ukraine’s search for a 
common history while attempting to base an identity on ethnicity gives inconsistent 
results. 
C. ETHNIC AND LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY OF UKRAINE 
1. Ethnicity and Language 
In contrast to Poland, Ukraine is not a homogeneous country, though at the same 
time, there has been little ethnic conflict. The peculiarity of the national structure of the 
population of Ukraine is its multinational composition.  According to the 2001 All-
Ukrainian Population Census data, the representatives of more than 130 nationalities and 
ethnic groups lived on the territory of Ukraine.69   
According to the same research, ethnic Ukrainians make up the largest group in 
the national structure with 77.8 percent of the population.  Ethnic Russians are the second 
numerous ethnic group of Ukraine, representing 17.3 percent of the population.  The 
remaining 4.9 percent of the population was made up of the remaining 128 ethnic groups, 
the largest of which include:  Belarusians, Moldavians, Tartars, Bulgarians, and 
Hungarians.  Additionally, only 74.7 percent of the families in Ukraine are ethnically 
homogeneous. 
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Linguistically, only 85 percent of ethnic Ukrainians claimed to speak Ukrainian 
exclusively, while almost 96 percent of ethnic Russians in Ukraine spoke Russian as their 
native language.   
The primary and most significant ethnic division is between Ukrainians and 
Russians (Fig 10.).  However, through high rates of intermarriage, the high percentage of 
Ukrainian-speaking Russians, the high level of fluency in Russian of Ukrainians, and a 




Figure 10.   Ukrainian Ethnicity70 
 
The conventional wisdom of ethnic relations in Soviet Ukraine had been one of a 
division of labor, with Ukrainians placed in lower-status occupational jobs, while 
Russians filled the higher-status positions.  Ukrainians alleged discrimination in access to 
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education, process of urbanization (the development and population growth of urban 
areas, often due to workers moving to the urban areas for employment), and 
immigration.71  The assumption was that the ethnic groups were in conflict, but no 
evidence has ever been presented.  In fact ethnic Ukrainians’ social standing was not 
inferior to ethnic Russians’ when considered in a comparative perspective.72  
Interestingly, there was a Soviet structural factor that allowed Ukrainians to be blocked 
from one job in Ukraine but eligible for another opportunity elsewhere in the Soviet 
Union.  The Soviet Union-wide system of personnel management exported trained 
Ukraine personnel who were willing to repress nationalist dissent and were loyal to the 
Soviet system from which they benefited.73  Thus, from Soviet days, educated Ukrainians 
were trained and rewarded to repress nationalistic tendencies. 
On the eve of independence, Ukrainian policy makers also realized that relations 
between ethnic groups might become problematic if post-independence governments 
were to introduce legislation favoring Ukrainians, thereby possibly politicizing and 
inciting the minorities.  To alleviate this concern, the Ukrainian parliament issued a 
Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine, which guaranteed citizens of all 
nationalities equal rights, including preservation of their traditional settlements and the 
freedom to use their native languages in all aspects of life in Ukraine.74 
To a large degree the policies pursued by Ukrainian policymakers has prevented 
ethnic/linguistic based conflict, but perhaps at the expense of building an enduring 
national identity.  Ukraine’s approach perpetuates the right of the non-Ukraine speaking 
populace at the expense of nation-building.  While this may have been a critical aspect of 
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lack of ethnic conflict, the language issues appears to emerge as a polarizing force during 
periods of local and national elections (Fig 11.). 
 
Figure 11.   Ukrainian Languages75 
 
2. Language in Politics 
The language issue has had little saliency, except during the 1994 and 2004 
presidential election campaigns and the 2006 parliamentary elections.  The Razumkov 
Center warned on the eve of the 2004 elections that the language issue in of itself would 
be unlikely to head to “serious social conflict,” but they added, “politicization of this 
question could lead to negative consequences.” Party of Regions leader Viktor 
Yanukovich and his Russian political advisors politicized the issue in the 2004 elections. 
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The spark that ignited the popular fire that is now known as the Orange 
Revolution was election fraud. Nonpartisan exit polls during the November 21, 2004 
presidential runoff election had given Yushchenko a commanding lead, with 52 percent 
of the votes, compared to Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich's 43 percent.  Yet when the 
official results came in, Yanukovich, the favorite of Ukraine's corrupt elite, had 
supposedly beaten the challenger by 2.5 percent. 
This tally was immediately challenged.  When the polling stations had first 
closed, the Central Election Commission (CEC) had reported that voter turnout in 
Ukraine's Russian-speaking eastern districts was consistent with the nationwide average 
of 78 to 80 percent.  But four hours later, after a prolonged silence, the election 
commission radically increased the east's turnout figures.  The eastern Donetsk region--
Yanukovich's Russian-speaking home base--went from a voter turnout of 78 percent to 
96.2 percent overnight, with support for Yanukovich at around 97 percent.  In 
neighboring Luhansk, turnout magically climbed from 80 percent at the time the polls 
closed to 89.5 percent the next morning, with Yanukovich winning 92 percent or more of 
the votes.  Indeed, in several eastern districts, turnout was as much as 40 percent greater 
than during the first round of the presidential election three weeks before.  This 
"miraculous" last-minute upsurge was responsible for approximately 1.2 million new 
votes--well over 90 percent of which went to the regime's favorite, giving him enough for 
a comfortable 800,000-vote margin of victory.76 
Millions of Ukrainians staged nationwide nonviolent protests that came to be 
known as the "Orange Revolution."  The entire world watched, riveted by this outpouring 
of the people's will in a country whose international image had been warped by its 
corrupt rulers.77  By the time victory was announced--in the form of opposition leader 
Viktor Yushchenko's electoral triumph--the orange revolution had set a major new 
landmark in the post communist history of eastern Europe, a seismic shift Westward in 
the geopolitics of the region. 
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However, time and again, Ukrainian parties often focus on the language issue 
when they want to mobilize their electorates.  Similar to the 2004 Presidential election, 
Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich’s Party of Regions (PRU), again, quite successfully 
played the language card in the run-up to the March 2006 parliamentary election.  One of 
its main election promises was to give Russian official status.78  The Party of Regions and 
Communists are alone in their support for elevating the status of the Russian language.  A 
large proportion of the centrist camp that backed the corrupt Leonid Kuchma regime 
continues to support the 1989 law and 1996 constitution that make Ukrainian the sole 
state language but provides for official tolerance of local language diversity. 
However, the Orange Revolution seems to make one thing clear:  Ukrainian civil 
society has shown its resolve to no longer be politically manipulated by corrupt political 
forces.  Indeed, of the ten most acute problems facing Ukraine, the Russian language was 
mentioned by only 8 percent, a figure due primarily to the 25 percent interest level in the 
Crimea and Donbas. North and east of these two regions only between 2.5 percent and 4 
percent saw it is as an issue.79  Two-thirds of the 8 percent who consider the Russian 
language an issue reside in the Donbas and Crimea, two areas that are bastions of support 
for the Party of Regions and Communists and ironically where Russian is not in any way 
challenged, let alone threatened.  Linguistic identity is a sensitive issue in a society 
divided roughly in half along linguistic lines. 
Yushchenko, addressing in the Russian-speaking Crimea in February 2007, said 
that the Ukrainian legislation does not provide for the status of regional language.  
Meeting young Ukrainian scientists in Kyiv a day earlier, Yushchenko said that those 
who do not want Ukraine to be free are the ones who do not accept the single national 
language. “There is no nation without a language,” he said.80 
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While Yushchenko has lost much of the momentum of the Orange Revolution, 
and his first administration was unable to merge the Ukrainian constituency into one 
consolidated national identity, the recent elections may offer the opportunity to 
reconstitute an Orange Coalition.  That the citizens of an ethnically and linguistically 
diverse Ukraine have been able to use democratic means to voice preferences is due 
primarily to Ukraine’s inclusive policy.  While this policy may, in fact, preclude the 
emergence of a consolidated national identity based on ethnicity or language, it also 
guarantees no political discrimination or isolation along ethic lines. 
Rather than overall social ethnic composition and language cleavages as well as 
the potential for creating cleavages that would hamper development of a national identity, 
the real problem appears to have been regionalism. 
D. REGIONALISM 
Just as independence was finally coming to Ukraine, there were several claims for 
regional autonomous areas based on ethnicity and territorial claims.  The most serious 
was in Crimea, which eventually won a wide-range of autonomy granted by the 
Ukrainian Constitution.  The success of the Crimea led many other regions to seek 
autonomy at the expense of national unity.  The other centrifugal tendencies started to 
appear in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine and southern Ukraine, where the idea of 
“New Russia” began. 
Crimea gained autonomous status that was acknowledged by the government of 
Ukraine.  In fact, Crimean elites also warned of further secession on the threat of “forced 
Ukrainization.”81  Political elites in other areas were emboldened by this move, and the 
quest for regional autonomy spread. 
In the Donbas region and other southern parts of Ukraine, where ethnic Russians 
lived and the Russian language was predominant, movements supporting autonomy 
emerged in the 1990s.  The issue of autonomy remained politically relevant for Crimea 
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and Donbas, but subsided in other regions.  The regional autonomy issue obviously 
serves as an obstacle to a unified national identity. 
In 1991, Ukrainians faced a referendum vote.  Voting ‘for’ the referendum meant 
support for Ukrainian independence, while a ‘no’ vote indicated a desire for regional 
splintering and remain part of the Soviet Union.  The referendum passed with 90.3 
percent of the vote, suggesting that at that time, national unity was stronger and the 
secessionist movement was weaker that political discussions indicated.82  
In fact, the regional autonomy issue caused more fractioning of the Ukrainian 
society.  The Western Ukrainians view the south and east as overly Russified and, thus, it 
would take more resources to develop a consolidated Ukrainian national identity.  
Conversely, the Ukrainians in the east have widespread suspicions of the westerners, 
manifested in the Crimean’s fear of “forced Ukrainization.”  This policy has been 
deemphasized in recent administrations, but Yuschenko’s current administration has not 
significantly changed policy with respect to ethnic groups.  This “don’t-rock-the-ethnic-
boat” policy has maintained a degree of stability, but at the expense of national identity. 
An important aspect of national policy is the institutional relationship between the 
central government and the regional power players.  One might argue that due to the 
ineffectiveness of the central government to consolidate a national identity, a 
conservative model of regional governance emerged.  Hence, local authorities gradually 
consolidated regional power over the regional financial-industrial groups (FIGs).  These 
FIGs have successfully lobbied for their own interests; of course, this is not Ukrainian 
patriotism, rather a love for "one's own" and "one's own must be protected.”83 
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E POLITICAL CLIMATE 
In addition to limited history to draw upon to fashion a lasting national identity, 
Ukraine has little self-governance history to draw on as well.  Ukraine’s political 
experience in recent history is limited to domination by the Russian empire and then by 
Soviet Russia.   
As is often the case in post-colonial countries, the old elite, emboldened by the 
departure of the old imperial power, proceed to exert their authority.  The elite no longer 
had to account to the external power nor to its own citizenry, thus the Ukrainian 
communist elite reinvented themselves.  On the eve of independence, the old communist 
elites were able to hold on to power by playing conflicting agendas of the splintered 
regions of Ukraine.84  The Ukrainians in the west and in Kiev advocated democracy and 
reversal of decades of Russification.  The industrial Donbas region wanted to slow 
modernization that would reduce Soviet/Russian subsidies.  However, the Ukrainians in 
the Donbas region soon moved toward the political center.   
This movement allowed the Rukh (Ukrainian popular Movement), one of the first 
liberal political parties in Ukraine, to build a coalition made up of nationalists, moderates, 
and workers from the Donbas region.85  The nationalists wanted independence to 
preserve Ukrainian culture and language.  The moderates believed independence would 
end exploitation by Moscow.  The success of Rukh in bridging diverse interest and 
identities would not be repeated. 
The Communist Party of Ukraine Secretary for Ideology, Leonid Kravchuk, built 
a coalition in an attempt to strengthen the state.  Kravchuk’s commitment to social justice 
appealed to eastern Ukrainians, who feared modernization would erode their position of 
economic power.  Kravchuk’s understanding of nationalism allowed him to engage 
western Ukrainians who insisted on independence.  The industrial and agricultural old 
guard believed that Kravchuk, as a member of the old guard himself, would not meddle 
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in their interests.  Ukraine’s communist elite built a new power base, but without 
changing any policies, thus hampering Ukraine’s national identity development. 
The widening gulf over national identity was obvious in the election of 1994, 
when Ukrainians elected Leonid Kuchma over the former Soviet Kravchuk.  During the 
campaign, Kuchma stressed the necessary relationship with Russia, while Kravchuk 
emphasized efforts to build a distinct Ukrainian state under the Central European 
Ukrainian idea.86  In short, the political right in Ukraine stresses the European heritage of 
Ukraine and the political left stresses the factors that Ukraine shares with Belarus and 
Russia.   
When Kuchma was elected in 1994 on a pro-Russian platform, his strategic 
foreign policy was disconnected.  By the time he took power, he shifted to a pro-Western 
position.  By 1998, Kuchma outlined Ukraine’s desire to join the EU, placing it on a 
drastically different path than Russia or Belarus.  However, by 1999, Kuchma once again 
reverses course and reorients towards Russia.  This reflects a ‘multi-vector’ approach, 
which has plagued Ukraine since independence.87  Ukraine waivers between Russian and 
Euro-Atlantic orientation due to a lack of national identity on which to anchor its 
perception of itself and other states. 
Yushchenko came to power on the wave of the Orange Revolution and 
immediately announced an end to Ukraine’s multi-vectorism.  He promised that 
Ukraine’s foreign policy would be consistent and predictable.88  However, as early as 
June 2005, Yushchenko held out prospect of Ukraine’s participation in the Russian-led 
Single Economic Space (SES) project.  This discourse, addressed mainly to Russia and to 
certain economic interest groups in Ukraine, is diverging from that of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration, 
who firmly adhere to the EU option in the knowledge that it is incompatible with  
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participation in the SES.  This disagreement within the government exacerbates the 
national identity issue.  Adding to this instability is the distribution of power with in the 
government. 
Following the Orange Revolution of 2004, constitutional reform and the 2006 
parliamentary elections made pro-Russian Prime Minister Yanukovich the most powerful 
man in Ukraine, clashed between him and President Yushchenko over distribution of 
power and almost daily occurrence.  
A transitional period is by definition often unstable, which would be worsened 
with no common political culture.  The duration and magnitude of the crisis is based on 
the ability of the government to propose a course of action that is agreeable for the 
society and to consistently maintain that course of action to provide stability for the 
society.  The transition marked by the Orange Revolution, while representing a move 
towards democratic measures, did not foster a political culture for social stability.  In fact, 
political differences within the Orange coalition between Yushchenko and Yulia 
Tymoshenko, the other main leader of the Orange Revolution, have prevented the 
consolidation of an effective government. 
In retrospect many of the hopes that drove the Orange Revolution were overly 
optimist tic.  The Orange coalition was a reflection of Ukrainian society, in that it was a 
heterogeneous collection of disparate groups ranging from pro-Western nationalistic 
forces in the west to Socialists on the left.  After the March 2006 parliamentary elections, 
the same inertia was apparent when Yushchenko spent three months forming a 
government and only at the last minute agreed to reconstitute the Orange coalition.  The 
long delay further eroded trust between Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine party and 
Tymoshenko’s Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko party.  However, this reconstituted coalition was 
short lived. 
In July 2006, Socialist party leader Olexandr Moroz, upset because he was not 
awarded the speaker of the parliament, defected and joined with Yanukovich’s Party of 
Regions.  This gave the Regions party enough votes to form an “anti-crisis coalition” led 
by Yanukovich with a parliamentary majority.  Due to this, Ukraine has had two 
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diverging foreign policies:  Yushchenko’s attempts at Western integration and 
Yanukovich’s “multivector” strategy designed to balance between pragmatic ties to the 
west and close relations with Russia. 89 
F. EXTERNALITIES  
1. Russian Influence 
Geographically, Ukraine is situated between the former Soviet bloc states and 
Russian.  The former are, by and large, democratic and members of the European Union 
while Russia continually attempts to extend and solidify its influence beyond its borders 
in an attempt to regain superpower status. 
The relations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine are an important 
component of the international situation in the area of the former Soviet Union.  In terms 
of population and GDP in the region, Ukraine is second only to Russia. The majority of 
Russian elites and society have never come to terms with the loss of Ukraine, believing 
that it is the eternal part of the Russian empire and that control over it is a precondition 
for Russia’s strong international position. Finally, both states remain closely 
interconnected, which allows the stronger partner, which is Russia, to exert pressure on 
the counterpart, and thwart its attempts at independent policy making. 
Most analysts note another important factor strongly affecting Ukrainian-Russian 
relations:  Ukraine’s economic dependence on Russia.  The Ukrainian economy depends 
heavily on Russian energy exports.  The external obstacle to national identity, Russian 
interference, should be emphasized.  Russia’s strategy of ideological and economic 
(especially energy related) blackmailing has slowed the process of national identity 
development in Ukraine.  These strategies are most effective in the Eastern and Southern 
parts of Ukraine with strong pro-Russian sentiment. 
2. Western Influence 
The Ukrainian policy in the period immediately following independence sought to 
build a Central European identity similar to movements in Poland at the same time.  This 
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policy was based on the image of Ukraine held mostly by those in the western part of the 
country, where national identity is nearly as strong as it is in Poland.90  However, until 
the Orange Revolution in 2004, the years have been marked by inconsistent and multi-
vectored policies by elites.  Yushchenko announced the end of multi-vectorism and 
promised that Ukraine’s foreign policy would be ideologically committed to Euro-
Atlantic integration.91   
a. European Union 
After the Orange Revolution, Yushchenko has stepped up efforts to join 
the EU.  First, he argued the EU should recognize Ukraine as a market economy, which it 
did in December 2005.  Second, he wanted the EU to support Ukrainian accession to the 
WTO, which would allow Ukraine to create a free-trade area with the EU.  Third, 
Yushchenko wanted the EU to upgrade Ukraine to a status of association membership as 
a final step before EU membership.  The door to the EU, however, had remained closed.  
Under the previous administration, the EU was concerned about offending Russia; the 
EU argued that it could not invite Ukraine without also inviting Russia.   
The question of EU membership had been one of the few nationally 
unifying issues in Ukrainian history.  Most non-Communist political parties support EU 
membership because of the benefits it would bring in terms of democratization and 
improved standard of living.92  Thus, EU membership is not as divisive an issue as 
potential NATO membership. 
The EU, however, has adopted a policy of ambiguity.  It hopes to string 
out a series of small rewards to encourage reforms in Ukraine without committing fully to 
Ukrainian membership in the EU.  The issue is that membership is the ultimate incentive 
for countries to carry out painful reforms.  Without the prospect of membership, even in 
                                                 
90 Stephen Burant, “Foreign Policy and National Identity,”  Europe-Asia Studies, 47, November 1995, 
1126. 
91 Taras Kuzio, “Is Ukraine Part of Europe’s Future,” 89-90. 
92 Taras Kuzio, “Is Ukraine Part of Europe’s Future?”  93-4. 
 54 
the long-term, current and subsequent Ukrainian governments may be unwilling to bear 
the short-term burdens of reform that EU membership requires. 
The EU’s hesitation leaves Ukraine stranded with no institutional anchor 
in the West.  This will make it more difficult for pro-western politicians to develop a 
consolidated national identity or muster domestic support to undertake reforms needed 
for EU membership.93 
b. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
In accordance with his new policy, Yushchenko managed to initiate a 
breakthrough in Ukraine’s relations with NATO.  In April 2005, NATO invited Ukraine 
to join the Intensified Dialogue on Membership, one of the first steps to NATO 
membership.  In the Spring of 2006, NATO members discussed the possibility of offering 
Ukraine a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the Riga summit.  However, Yanukovich’s 
return to power in August 2006, preempted those plans.  In contrast to Yushchenko, 
Yanukovich adopted a much slower paced approach to NATO membership.  He sought to 
set limits to Ukrainian involvement with NATO and announced Ukraine would not seek a 
MAP, citing a lack of public support for NATO.  Indeed, among the populace, NATO is 
perceived differently than EU membership. 
Ukraine’s relations with NATO have emerged as a particularly divisive 
issue since the collapse of the Orange coalition.  Decades of Soviet propaganda against 
NATO, coupled with NATO’s intervention in Kosovo as well as the U.S.-led invasion of 
Iraq, continue to cause regional divisions over attitudes towards NATO membership.  
Three of the five party factions in the newly elected parliament are against NATO 
membership.94  
One of the key problems is that support for NATO membership in Ukraine 
is much lower than other new NATO members from eastern Europe.  According to polls 
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in October 2006, only about 17 percent of Ukrainians support NATO membership.95  
Also, that same poll indicated that over 50 percent of the population would vote against a 
referendum on NATO membership.  This is largely due to the Soviet legacy as well as 
the anti-NATO campaign conducted by Yanukovich in the 2004 presidential election.  
Support for NATO membership is highest in the western and central parts of Ukraine and 
lowest in the pro-Russian eastern and southern Ukraine. 
However, as much as 45 percent of the population in the western region 
has no opinion on NATO membership.  Many of these “undecideds” could be mobilized 
to support NATO membership if the Ukrainian government developed an effective 
education program, as many other eastern European countries did prior to joining the 
alliance. 
In light of the political differences in the Ukrainian leadership and the lack 
of public support for NATO membership in Ukraine, membership in NATO is likely to 
be put on hold for the near future.  Cooperation will continue, but there will not be a large 
push for Ukrainian membership until popular support for membership is stronger.96 
c. U.S. Policy 
Historically, the U.S. has been one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters of 
western integration since independence.  However, the U.S. is not preoccupied with other 
geopolitical issues such as Iraq, Iran, China, and North Korea.  Keeping Ukraine high on 
the list is important, but may prove to be challenging. 
Ukraine’s development will have a critical impact on the overall balance 
of power in the post-Soviet space and on developments in Russia, Georgia, and Belarus.  
For all its challenges, Ukraine is far more open and democratic than Russia or Belarus.  
For this reason, the U.S. should develop a maintainable and in-depth policy to promote 
economic and political reform that will help anchor Ukraine to Western institutions.  The 
U.S. and the EU should encourage Ukraine to take the reforms necessary to qualify for 
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EU membership.  Perhaps Ukraine could be rewarded for short term reforms will 
participation is some EU activities such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy to 
start increasing the bonds with the West.97 
NATO membership should remain an option.  Ukraine’s membership 
should not be accelerated, but membership in this security organization would add to 
stability and again, help tie Ukraine to the West, especially since Ukraine’s potential for 
joining the EU is relatively slim at this time.  The U.S. should encourage and assist the 
Ukrainian government to develop an education campaign aimed at educating the 
Ukrainian population about NAOT membership. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Modern day Ukraine has all the attributes of a state except a consolidated national 
identity.  The primary internal reasons for the lack of national identity are the 
interpretations of the history of the Ukrainian people, ethnic composition, and regional 
loyalties.  Ukraine, with all the potential for independent statehood remains in a state of 
limbo.  Therefore, the project of nation building should be considered the most important 
national agenda, given that Ukraine has no clearly dominant ethnic group, little usable 
historical experience as a nation-state, and splintering regional politics. 
The primordialist approach noted in Chapter II, suggests that nations cannot be 
constructed artificially, but must be grown organically.  Constructivist theory argues that 
nations are modern creations, usually by elites, based on myths and memories.  In 
contrast, ethnosymbolism is a middle ground between the two previous theories, and 
suggests nations are formed through the inclusion of the whole populace, not only the 
elites and the importance of treating the history of collective cultural identities over time.  
Thus the case of Ukraine suggests that none of the theories is adequate to understand the 
complex process of Ukrainian nation building. 
Contrary to the Polish experience, which was able to develop a national identity 
from within, the situation in Ukraine is different for both internal and external reasons.   
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Internally, the differences are not only language, a more heterogeneous society than 
Poland, but more importantly are derived from a lack of historic nation-state experience 
and a lack of collective memory.  Externally, the interference of Russia on ethnic, 
linguistic, regional, and economic levels exacerbates the present divisions in Ukrainian 
society.  
While Ukrainian vote for independence in 1991 was not primarily aimed at a 
question of a “return to Europe,” most supported the vote for independence as a means to 
shed the yoke of Russian servitude as opposed to independence as an end itself.  
Additionally, the growth of regionalism continues to undermine the development of a 
consolidated national identity.  Regionalism in Ukraine may well lead to an even greater 
control of the regions by local political ‘clans’, each with their own agenda.  The 
autonomous Crimea may well be the first issue to break the tenuous cohesion of Ukraine.  
Crimea has been managed well, but the root issues have never been resolved, and may 
deepen the divide in Ukrainian society on whether a compromise with Russia is desirable. 
The persistent absence of a clear vision for Ukraine’s future by the political 
leaders and society at large will continue to hinder a consolidated national identity.  


























This thesis examined the formation of national-identity through a comparative 
analysis of Poland and Ukraine.  The research suggests that it is impossible to apply a 
purely primordialist or constructivist approach to explain national identity formation.   
However, these two theories give the basis for a popular, third theory, ethnosymbolism.  
As discussed in Chapter II, primorialism suggests that nations are organically grown 
entities which cannot be constructed or artificially created.  In contrast, constructivism 
argues that nations are modern creations based on common myths and memories; 
belonging to an ethnic group is often a matter of perception.   The middle ground of 
ethnosymbolism suggests that a nation is born by including the entire population in a 
historic territorial homeland with common historical myths and memories linked by a 
common culture.    
Despite the differences in the explanation, the models above contribute some 
helpful generalizations; none of the above theories should be wholly rejected or accepted.  
The helpful generalizations are: 
1.  A sense of belonging to a larger group can evolve over time, whether it is 
organic or constructed. 
2. Historical memories based on actual events or myths strengthen national 
identity. 
3.  A historical homeland is critical to national identity.  The actual location of 
this homeland is also as important as the homeland itself.  
B. NATIONAL IDENTITY 
The overall goal of this thesis was to explore the process of national identity 




country’s neighbors:   Poland.  The bottom line from the analyses of these two countries 
is that, while there are common Slavic roots and cultural cross-influences, they represent 
vastly different political entities. 
Poland’s national identity has persisted despite loss of independence and severe 
threats during World War II and the communist era.  This is due in part to its 
geographical position but also due to an organic political elite and a powerful sense of 
cultural distinctiveness.  However, it was not until the modern era that the Polish national 
idea spread to the popular consciousness, a key element in the ethnosymbolism theory.  
Indeed, Poland has developed an enduring, collective national identity with the elites and 
the masses sharing common national cultural attributes.  Thus, the development of Polish 
national identity was dependent on the transfer of the collective memory from the elite to 
the masses.  Poland was able to develop and maintain a common national identity 
because of its center of gravity, that is, the collective memory of its homeland and mass 
culture. 
Conversely, Ukraine has all the attributes to be a nation-state, yet remains in a 
state of uncertainty.  Therefore, nation building, based on a consolidated national identity, 
should be the most important national endeavor.    
The appearance of an independent Ukraine in 1991 was unexpected by most 
scholars due to the incomplete and ill-defined Ukrainian national identity.  However, 
once an independent Ukraine appeared, the country’s leaders have declared a 
commitment to market transformation, political unity, and democratic reforms.  Yet, 
these developments have been slow or nonexistent due to factors described in this thesis. 
The most important factors identified in this analysis are:  Ukraine’s geographic 
location, which leads to external pressures on national identity formation; the absence of 
“usable” history; and regional differences in culture, language, and ethnicity.  As 
described in this thesis these issues are the reason for a lack of a unified Ukrainian 
national identity.   
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Externally, Russian interference conducted by Russian ideologists and historians 
attempts to undermine Ukrainian efforts of nation building by building discord between 
the Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the South and East with those nationally conscious 
Ukrainians in the West.   
Additionally, another important external factor is Western influence.  Recent 
Ukrainian leaders have declared a foreign policy directed at Euro-Atlantic integration, yet 
this has proven to be overly optimistic.   
The external factors outlined above should be considered the major cause of 
regional differences within Ukraine.  As this thesis reveals, the process of nation-building 
is intertwined with state-building.  The United States and European Union member states 
have an important stake in the outcome of this process because it will not only 
significantly shape Ukraine’s foreign policy orientation, but also influence the balance of 
power on Europe’s eastern edge.  Only the development of a consolidated, distinctly 
Ukrainian national identity will determine if Ukraine will “return to Europe” or be pulled 
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